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Abstract: This article reports findings from an evaluation of a Global Positioning 
System (GPS) pilot that took place in the Cardiff Integrated Offender Management Unit 
(IOMU). The evaluation was based primarily upon qualitative interviews with about half 
of the tracked sample of offenders, plus interviews with key stakeholders from the IOMU, 
police and courts. The findings revealed a general consensus of positive views from 
both offenders and practitioners about the experience of GPS tracking. However, these 
generally positive outcomes were clearly related to the voluntary and relatively targeted 
nature of the pilot, which would be challenged if/when GPS tracking was introduced 
more widely. 
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This article describes a small evaluation study of a Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking 
pilot that took place in the Cardiff Integrated Offender Management Unit (IOMU) between 
January and December 2012. GPS or ‘satellite tracking’ is a relative newcomer to the British 
penal landscape, although the practice has been established for some time in parts of the 
USA. Much of what is known about in the UK concerns electronic monitoring (EM) through 
the operation of curfews supported by ‘static’ radio frequency (RF) tags. EM has been 
described by Nellis (2009) as a distinctively new kind of ‘late modern’ penality, one whose 
primary characteristic is surveillance rather than confinement. These kinds of argument apply 
with even more force to satellite tracking that offers a degree of potential surveillance of 
offenders’ movements previously unheard of in community supervision. The aims of the 
current article are to help address the current gap in empirical research about satellite tracking 
in the UK, and explore some of the broader implications of the approach. The article is 
divided into four main sections. The first provides a brief overview of developments in EM in 
England and Wales, and summarises key themes in extant research on EM and satellite 
tracking. The second summarises the aims and methods of the current study. The third 
outlines the key findings of the research; and the final section provides some reflections for 
future directions in policy and practice.  
 
Electronic Monitoring in England and Wales 
Since the 1990s, EM of offenders has become an increasingly important part of the criminal 
justice system in England and Wales. EM can be applied at three points in the criminal justice 
system: as a condition of bail, as a sentence of the court, and as a condition of release from 
prison. The use of EM as a condition of bail was trialled in the late 1980s (Mair and Nee 
1990). The use of EM as a sentence of the court was introduced by the Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Act 1994, which allowed for EM-enforced curfew of two-twelve hours per day 
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for up to six months, as part of a community sentence. Between 1995 and 1997, there were 
Home Office trials of about 300 such curfew orders in different parts of England and Wales 
(Mair and Mortimer 1996). The use of EM was then extended under Labour administrations, 
with expanding its use to fine defaulters and young offenders, sanctioning the removal of the 
consent requirement, and finally introducing the Home Detention Curfew (HDC) scheme. 
The HDC scheme provided for early release from prison for certain categories of prisoners 
nearing the end of their sentence and willing to undergo EM enforced curfew. Since this time, 
there has been a substantial expansion of the use of electronically monitored curfews, 
growing from 9,000 cases in 1999/2000 to 116,000 in 2010/11 (Gallagher 2011). EM curfews 
are now one of twelve requirements of the generic community sentence (introduced through 
the Criminal Justice Act 2003). As such, it can be used to support other elements of an order 
(such as probation supervision or drug/alcohol treatment) or as a sentence in its own right.  
 
The majority of the use of EM in the UK (and in other parts of the world) to date has 
involved RF curfew tagging that alerts supervising officials if the offender moves beyond a 
certain distance from a base unit during specified time periods. The subject of the curfew is 
required to wear a tag, usually worn round the ankle or wrist, and have a monitoring unit 
installed (usually in the home). These systems use a radio signal, and the tag acts as a 
transmitter that communicates with the monitoring unit. This, in turn, updates the authorities 
and ensures that the subject does not breach his/her curfew by leaving home during a 
particular period (Nellis 2009). Although more recently arrived in the UK, tracking via active 
GPS has been established in the USA for many years (for example, it was first implemented 
in Florida in 1997, see Bales et al. (2010)). This form of EM can track offender location in 
‘real time’ using global positioning satellites. In ‘active’ GPS, offenders are actively 
monitored in real time, with monitoring officials responding quickly to breaches of 
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conditions. ‘Passive’ GPS stores data for a set period and transmits a summary of data to the 
system, for retrospective review if necessary. 
Between 2005 and 2013, two companies held the UK government contract for 
operating EM in England and Wales: Serco and G4S. These did not include any GPS 
provision. Local satellite tracking pilot schemes were, however, operating on a non-statutory 
basis from September 2004 to June 2006 in three areas of England: Greater Manchester, 
Hampshire, and the West Midlands. Following these pilots, the then Labour government 
decided against proceeding with a national rollout (Offenders’ Tag Association 2010). 
However, interest re-emerged as a result of GPS trials arranged outside the auspices of the 
Ministry of Justice (MoJ) with the private company Buddi1 and Hertfordshire police in 2010. 
The Hertfordshire model introduced GPS tracking to its existing Integrated Offender 
Management (IOM) programme to manage and monitor Prolific and Priority Offenders 
(PPOs), and the trials received significant attention from the Coalition government (2010). A 
conservative think tank, Policy Exchange, published a report which supported further 
expansion of EM, including GPS (Geoghegan 2012). The company, Buddi, was very much 
seen to be at the forefront of GPS technology and fitted neatly into the Conservative Party’s 
Technology Manifesto (Nellis 2014). The report stressed the financial imperatives of GPS 
tracking but also reflected on ‘Buddi/police confidence in the superior potential’ of this 
technology (Nellis 2014, p.175). Following the Hertfordshire pilots, further GPS tracking 
pilots were introduced across England and Wales such that by late 2012, it was reported that 
27 police forces, probation areas and youth offending teams were running or showing interest 
in establishing GPS tracking pilots (Nellis 2014).  
These developments affected the next round of EM contract awards in August 2013. 
With the withdrawal of Serco and G4S due to the accusations of fraudulent overcharging and 
further scandals involving them, four companies, Capita, Buddi, Astrium, and Telefonica, 
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were named as preferred bidders for a new six-year contract for EM. Capita was named the 
preferred bidder for the overall management of the service, with the three other firms 
commissioned to deliver elements of the infrastructure. However, in March 2014, Buddi 
pulled out of negotiations citing repeated changes in specification and a risk to its intellectual 
property as its reason (Financial Times 2014). The new service will make use of GPS, though 
it is unclear in what capacity. Since this time, the Policy Exchange report’s author has made 
further calls for an expansion of GPS tracking in the criminal justice system, and in particular 
to devolve commissioning powers (and related funding) from the MoJ to elected Police and 
Crime Commissioners (PCCs) at the local level (Geoghegan 2015). PCCs have themselves 
campaigned to have the powers and funding to commission GPS tracking services, but to date 
with little success as the MoJ has reiterated its commitment to a centralised commissioning 
process (Nellis 2014).  
Supporters of EM have suggested that it potentially provides a less damaging, yet 
credible, community sentence as an alternative to prison, with a consequent reduction in costs 
for the criminal justice system. It is also promoted as a more effective and reliable way of 
detecting curfew breaks or other non-compliance with community sentence/release from 
custody conditions, a reduction of reoffending through either greater deterrence (for example, 
a greater perceived chance of detection) and/or providing rehabilitative benefits (in terms of 
giving a degree of structure to the daily lives of offenders, allowing them to maintain family/ 
community/employment ties etc.) (see Offenders’ Tag Association 2010). On the other hand, 
critics have highlighted civil liberties concerns about the implications of EM (degrading or 
disproportionate punishment, damaging implications for offenders’ families, the extension of 
State control into the family sphere etc.), the problem of ‘net-widening’ (whereby offenders 
who would have received a lesser penalty than custody are placed under EM, as opposed to it 
being targeted on reducing the use of custody, for example), the danger that it will replace 
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constructive ‘face-to-face’ work between offenders and probation officers, and broader 
concerns about the involvement of corporate interests in the penal system (see Jones 2014; 
Nellis 1991, 2005, 2013). This last concern becomes particularly acute in the context of the 
controversial reforms to the probation service in England and Wales under ‘Transforming 
Rehabilitation’. This has involved the replacement, from February 2015, of the previous 35 
individual Probation Trusts with a single National Probation Service (responsible for the 
management of high-risk offenders) and 21 Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs) 
comprising consortia of private and voluntary agencies which are responsible for the 
management of low- to medium-risk offenders in 21 areas across England andWales (Calder 
and Goodman 2013). The market imperative for the CRCs to drive down costs of delivering 
services may well ‘lead them to prefer cheaper EM-technologies over people-skills’ (Nellis 
2014, p.186). 
There is now a substantial body of research evidence on the operation and impact of 
EM, though the majority of this focuses upon static forms of RF monitoring (see Nellis 
2009). This research has suggested that EM curfews can have positive impacts, relating to 
improved compliance with curfew conditions, to changing the criminogenic ‘habits’ of some 
offenders (Hucklesby 2008). However, much of the extant research continues to 
conceptualise EM in terms of a confinement discourse – presenting it as an alternative to 
custody (Nellis 2009). Nellis argues that this fails to capture the distinctive nature of EM, as a 
qualitatively new form of penality whose primary characteristic relates to its surveillant 
properties. Nellis goes on to argue that although much analysis of EM draws upon ‘ocular 
metaphors’ such as the ‘panoptican’, it is not helpful to theorise EM primarily in term of 
Foucauldian ‘discipline’. In itself, EM is not really disciplinary in the Foucauldian sense 
because it does not seek to work on the ‘soul’ of the offender, and to transform their ways of 
thinking. It works simply by introducing spatial-temporal regulations over their bodies, and 
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even then this does not physically confine them in the way that prison does. They retain 
choice about whether, and how much, to comply with the restrictions upon them, albeit in the 
knowledge that the electronic surveillance raises the probability of detection of any breaches. 
Nellis also argues that previous research has not paid sufficient attention to examining the 
experiences of those on the end of electronic surveillance, with the focus of official 
evaluations often upon statistical measures of breaches and reoffending that give little insight 
into the precise mechanisms via which EM does (or does not) affect behaviour. A number of 
studies have explored the views of offenders who have experienced EM. Hucklesby’s (2008, 
2009) study drew on interviews with 76 offenders wearing an EM tag, and Richardson’s 
(2002) study reported her experience as a participant observer of EM, by actually undergoing 
an EM curfew herself. Hucklesby found that in some cases, EM-enforced curfew orders 
reduced offending via their effects on offenders’ social capital. She found that curfews both 
reduced offenders’ ‘anti-social capital’ (that is, contact with ‘situations, people, places and 
networks’ associated with their offending), and enhanced levels of ‘pro-social’ capital (for 
example, improving connections with family and employment). However, she also noted that 
curfew orders can have negative impacts on pro-social capital by disrupting employment and 
family ties and responsibilities.  
In relation to satellite tracking forms of EM, there is limited research evidence 
available from the UK given the limited experience to date of this form of EM. The 2005/06 
pilots mentioned above were subject to independent evaluation (Shute 2007). The study 
found that sentencers generally had positive views about satellite tracking as a sentencing 
option, field monitoring officers reported that the equipment had performed well, the majority 
of offender managers were positive about the satellite tracking, and almost half of offenders 
wearing the tracker reported that GPS had helped them to avoid trouble. However, a 
substantial minority of offender managers expressed negative views about GPS tracking, 
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suggesting that more positive face-to-face work with offenders was reduced as meetings 
became dominated by technical discussions about the equipment etc. In addition, 58% of 
offenders wearing a GPS tracker in the pilots were recalled or had community penalties 
rescinded for breaking their regimes. There were also some problems relating to the technical 
performance of the equipment, and also with speed of response to requests to the monitoring 
companies for data.  
More extensive research evidence on the use and impact of GPS tracking is available 
from the USA, given the longer experience of this form of EM and the greater potential for 
larger-scale research designs (Nellis 2005). These studies have produced mixed results in 
terms of the impact of GPS as compared with RF tracking. For example, Padgett, Bales and 
Blomberg (2006) analysed data on almost 76,000 offenders placed on home curfew in Florida 
between 1998 and 2002, comparing outcomes for EM (both RF and GPS) and non-EM cases. 
They found that both forms of EM reduced significantly the probability of technical 
violations, reoffending and absconding. Whilst such studies provide a useful backdrop to 
considering GPS tracking in the UK, Nellis (2006) makes a number of points of caution. The 
large-scale quantitative research designs may provide a veneer of scientific credibility, but 
provide little evidence about the supposed mechanisms via which compliance is achieved, 
nor the longer-term outcomes for offenders. Most particularly, he warns against the uncritical 
acceptance of GPS tracking as a technological silver bullet, a ‘standalone panacea’ to 
concerns about insecurity and prison overcrowding that understandably proves tempting to 
politicians and the general public. His concerns about the dangers of ‘the pursuit of 
surveillance without rehabilitation’ seem prescient in the current political climate in England 
and Wales. 
 
The Cardiff Case Study 
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At the time of the study, Cardiff IOMU supervised and monitored about 270 IOM cohort 
offenders including PPOs, most of whom were repeat offenders convicted of serious 
acquisitive crimes such as robbery, domestic burglary and auto-crime. From January 2012, 
similar to GPS trials introduced in Hertfordshire, Cardiff IOMU made an agreement with 
Buddi for a free pilot including the provision of tracking equipment to enable tracking of 
around 40 cases (each for up to three months) from January 2012. The MoJ had not given 
permission for these to be used as a sentence of the court, and so the use of the GPS trackers 
during the pilot was restricted to those clients who consented voluntarily. Clients were given 
full information about the pilot, and also required to sign consent forms. Given the limited 
number of trackers to be supplied for the pilot, priority was given to licence cases subject to 
restrictive requirements, cases judged to be at ‘risk’ of breach/recall to custody, and offenders 
with index offences of burglary and/or robbery. Following the start of the pilot, the authors 
were commissioned by the South Wales Probation Trust to undertake a small-scale 
evaluation. 
Methods 
The study involved three elements. First, a series of qualitative semi structured interviews 
with about half of the offenders wearing a GPS tracker (n = 21) who participated in the pilot. 
These interviews covered issues such as motivation for participation in the pilot, general 
perceptions/ experiences of the tracker, practical issues relating to the equipment itself, and 
perceived impact on their own behaviour. Second, qualitative semi-structured interviews with 
key stakeholders (n = 19) including offender managers (OMs), police officers (POs), 
representatives of the Probation Trust, Buddi, HMP Cardiff, and local magistrates. Third, 
collation and analysis of available secondary data relating to each of the cases of 
GPS tracking (n = 43). This information was collated automatically via the web-based system 
operated by the Cardiff IOMU. It was hoped that analysis of these data would provide a clear 
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picture of the numbers and types of offenders subject to GPS tracking (and over what period); 
the number and types of incidents of non-compliance during tracking, and the consequences 
thereof (for example, breach, recall, etc.); and the number/type of incidents of arrest or 
reoffending during the tracked period. Comparisons with the wider IOMU population do not 
provide strong evidence that the sample of those who agreed to be GPS tracked for a period 
were dramatically different from the wider group of offenders under supervision by the 
IOMU (at least in terms of demographic features such as age, gender and ethnicity, and 
criminal justice-related factors such as main offence type and current criminal justice status). 
However, because of the small numbers involved, and the consequent impracticality of 
producing a control sample (based on random allocation of offenders to the GPS tracker), it 
was not possible to conduct robust statistical analysis of outcomes and the findings are not 
generalisable beyond those offenders who wore the GPS tracker in the group. For this reason, 
this article draws primarily on the interview data. As all those offenders participating in the 
pilot consented voluntarily, it is highly likely that as a group they were unrepresentative of 
the wider population of known offenders. 
 
Findings 
The following section presents an overview of the main findings from the evaluation study of 
the GPS tracking pilot that took place in the Cardiff IOMU. It first outlines some of the 
potential benefits of GPS tracking, before exploring some of the broader implications of GPS 
tracking including civil liberty concerns, net-widening and up-tariffing. 
 
Reduction in Police Attention 
A reduction in adversarial police contact in terms of curfew checks and being routinely 
stopped and questioned was one of the clearest benefits of the GPS tracker from the 
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viewpoint of offenders. In fact, this was one of the key ‘selling points’ which offender 
managers used to encourage offenders to voluntarily consent to wearing a GPS tracker. 
Consequently, 16 of the 21 offenders interviewed cited a reduction of curfew checks as the 
main reason for participating in the pilot. The following comment was typical in response to 
being asked why they had agreed to wear the tracker:  
 
I was going to be on a curfew when I got out anyway because I was a PPO but I could either 
have a curfew where they come in the nights and do physical checks or I could have a Buddi 
on and they’d know where I was so they wouldn’t have to come and wake me up in the 
middle of the night and stuff. (Oliver) 
 
Accordingly, all the offenders who were subject to curfew restrictions reported positively on 
this aspect of the tracker for themselves and where relevant, their families, and felt that it had 
delivered what they hoped in this regard: 
 
Since it’s been on, no police has called, no nothing it’s just everything is done. (Thomas) 
I didn’t want what was going on in my life like to negatively have an effect on my children’s 
lives like so you know I was quite happy to have it on . . . oh much better because the police 
were waking up the baby and stuff like that that so like when I was answering the door but 
then with the tag I didn’t . . . . (Harry) 
 
While it was not possible to get a precise estimate of how frequently each offender would 
have been visited by police officers in this way, it was implied that this could happen at least 
once nightly, sometimes more in response to assessed level of risk prior to the participant 
wearing the tracker. This suggests that there is a substantial saving in police time by 
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deploying the tracker in cases where curfew conditions have been applied. For example, 
according to the IOMU estimates, the unit cost to deploy police officers to physically check 
on an individual would amount to an average cost of £30 per visit (including a proportion to 
transport and administration costs). The majority, if not all, of the 43 offenders wearing the 
tracker would have been subject to physical police checks in the absence of GPS tracking. On 
average, tracked clients wore the tracker for a period of 40 days. Thus, based on the modest 
assumption of one curfew check per client per day, 40 days of physical curfew checks would 
cost approximately £1,200 per offender, compared with £350, which is the estimated cost of 
the GPS tracker and oncosts. This would amount to a saving per offender of £850, which 
amounts to a total cost saving in relation to police time (for 43 clients) of over £36,500. 
There was also a general consensus among the offender group that wearing the tracker 
protected them from coming under routine suspicion from the police when crimes took place 
in their area. This, too, could result in potential cost savings arising from the tracker enabling 
the police to eliminate these offenders from enquiries:  
 
It does help in my situation because I’m known for certain offences like street robberies and 
violent offences so if a street robbery did happen now and the description of the offender 
matched me I’m basically in the clear if I didn’t commit that crime I’m in the clear, there’s no 
way they can say I’ve done it because I wasn’t around that area and I can prove that with this 
tag so I think it’s a massive help to be honest with you. (Will) 
 
Another good thing about it as well in the past I’ve been arrested for things that wasn’t me so 
and I’ve been convicted of something that wasn’t me as well and I went to prison for 
something that wasn’t me, do you know what I mean? But they can eliminate you quickly 
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from, if they think that you might have been involved in something and you really wasn’t, 
then they can eliminate you, you know with the click of a button or whatever. (Neil) 
 
As the quotations above highlight, a number of the offenders interviewed believed that they 
were routinely stopped and searched, and recalled to prison on the ground of being arrested 
and charged for something they had not done. While we had no evidence to support their 
claims, this strong perception of being targeted unfairly by the police was a forceful 
motivation for participating in the pilot. For these offenders, wearing the tracker provided 
them with a secure ‘alibi’ to protect them from such accusations: 
 
Basically my tag’s my alibi basically so if I haven’t committed a crime they’ll know about it, 
I’ve got proof to prove it whilst being on this tag. (Will)  
 
It’s saved me once or twice as well . . . Where they’ve, something’s happened somewhere, 
they’ve phoned them and it’s like ‘where’s Mr [name]’ and I was nowhere near the area so 
it’s a good thing. (Paul) 
 
The offenders’ hostility towards the police is, perhaps, not that surprising given that all the 
offenders wearing a GPS tracker who took part in the pilot were known PPOs. They would, 
therefore, have experienced regular adversarial contact with the police, even when not on 
licence or under penal supervision of any kind. Whatever the grounds for these views, any 
reduction in police contact as a result of wearing the GPS tracker can only help to alleviate 
such tensions. In addition, the IOM approach of the Cardiff IOMU enabled these offenders to 
come into contact with police officers working within the unit on a regular basis and in a 
different context. This interaction in a different environment made a positive impact on the 
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way police were viewed and indeed changed some offenders’ perceptions of the police, for 
the better:  
 
I don’t like the police, can’t stand them but then I see a different side to someone like you got 
[name] who works in here, you got . . . [name] they’re alright, all they’ve done really is help 
me so I can’t really say nothing bad about them. (Paul) 
 
A related benefit cited by all those engaged with the pilot, was that a reduction of this source 
of tension could help to enhance offender engagement, reform and resettlement in the 
community. Most notably, it was seen to have a positive impact upon offenders finding a 
stable place of residence, which was considered key to increasing their chances of successful 
reintegration and resettlement on release from prison. Evidence gathered from the practitioner 
interviews suggested that both the families of offenders and housing providers were more 
likely to offer accommodation if they could be assured that they would not have their door 
knocked on, possibly at very unsocial hours, by the police undertaking curfew checks. At the 
same time the GPS tracker offered housing providers the assurance that the appropriate 
checking of compliance with curfew conditions was in place. Similarly, it was regarded as a 
signal to family members that the individual was motivated and trying to desist from 
offending: 
 
If it’s a housing provider and they know that somebody who has been a bit wayward in the 
past is on a tag, they are on a curfew, sometimes they don’t necessarily like the police calling 
all the time, so again that can impact on that person getting a residence. (OM5) 
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Their families tend not to like [the curfew check] so we kind of had the backing on a few 
occasions of their families saying ‘we’ll have them stay here but we don’t want the police 
calling’ and they’ve agreed, so they tend to do the motivational stuff almost for us. (OM7) 
 
Desistance and Motivation to Change 
Following on from above, there was some evidence that wearing the tracker helped to 
increase the offenders’ self-esteem and motivation to change: 
 
It can help with your own self-esteem like you know because you know that you know that 
you’re not doing nothing and you know then nobody’s going to come kick your door off or 
no police for something that you haven’t done because that can be a worry when you’re a 
PPO and you’re coming out and things that are happening in the area, police will come in and 
look at you anyway. (Evan) 
 
Yet not surprisingly, given the voluntary nature of the pilot, the majority of offenders claimed 
that they were determined to go straight in any case, and that participation in the pilot simply 
reflected a deeper commitment to change (rather than exerting a significant causal effect in 
itself). This was explained in terms of the GPS tracker being a symptom, rather than a cause, 
of a motivation to change. However, as the quotation below demonstrates, to argue that the 
tracker was not the primary cause of compliance is not to say that it had no positive effect on 
desistance. Indeed, there was evidence that the trackers provided an important degree of 
psychological reinforcement for those who were motivated to engage and to avoid offending: 
 
I think it is a good thing what they’re trying to do yeah because it definitely made me not, 
well it didn’t make me not reoffend but I didn’t reoffend do you know what I mean? I don’t 
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think I would have anyway even if I didn’t have a tracker, I was in fulltime employment and 
stuff but you definitely, before you’re going to do something, whoa! I got a tracker on my leg 
if I do this then I’m going to be back in prison before I’m probably even home do you know 
what I mean? You do the crime you walk round the corner they know where you are, they 
come to straight where you are and you’ll be arrested. (Neil) 
 
There was general consensus among offenders and practitioners that the tracker acted as a 
deterrent from offending. In contrast to the research on the 2004–06 pilots in England and 
Wales (Shute 2007), the majority of offenders who we interviewed reported that the GPS 
tracker had helped them to avoid reoffending, primarily because of the increased risk of 
detection: 
 
Well obviously when you’ve got that on your leg you’re not going to commit an offence are 
you? Unless you’re stupid like because you’re going to get caught like. (Neil) 
 
Other mechanisms of desistance that emerged in the interviews concerned the impact of 
wearing the tracker in terms of avoiding people and places associated with offending, and 
thereby reducing their ‘anti-social capital’ (Hucklesby 2008, 2009).One offender, Harry, felt 
that although the tracker was not the primary cause of his motivation to change (which he 
saw as pre-dating his agreement to wear the tracker), it did help him to avoid situations which 
triggered his offending (such as staying out drinking heavily at night). Another offender, Ian, 
reported that wearing the tracker had helped him avoid offending because former friends and 
associates with whom he had got into trouble now knew he was wearing a GPS tracker, and 
did not want him around them because this made him something of a liability: 
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Because it’s a tracking system people react completely different. If they’re doing something 
wrong and because I’ve been in jail so many time most of the people I know are criminals but 
it’s where I’ve kind of changed my attitude about things like now and avoid it all it was good 
for them to know that I was on tracking system and they didn’t want me in their company sort 
of thing to talk about dodgy business . . .Yeah got rid of people who have like been around 
me in the past which I was just making money for. (Ian) 
 
It should be noted that this deterrent effect appeared to rest, at least in part, on a 
misunderstanding of the way in which the GPS tracker was used (incorrectly viewing it as a 
form of ‘active’ tracking in real time, rather than the ‘passive’ system that was actually 
deployed).  
The practitioners interviewed suggested that the GPS tracker provided a good 
deterrent, particularly in terms of avoidance of breach and recall. For example, it was felt that 
the offenders had largely complied with the conditions of their licence. Consequently, the 
GPS tracker compared favourably with existing static tags. Offender managers also referred 
to a number of specific cases where the tracker had enabled them to avoid recall or other 
formal breach action in cases of apparent non-compliance with conditions, because the GPS 
data enabled confirmation of the client’s explanation.  
At the same time, and sometimes paradoxically, strong doubts were expressed about 
whether the tracker would prevent somebody determined to offend from doing so. A key 
reason for this was the fact that the offender has responsibility for charging the equipment. 
Both the offenders and practitioners argued that if an individual wearing a GPS tracker 
wanted to offend, then they could simply allow the battery charge to run out before 
committing their offence, claiming then that they had forgotten to charge up the equipment. 
Interestingly, of those offenders involved in the pilot that had reoffended (n = 4), all were 
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wearing the GPS tracker at the time. Their cases, arguably, reflect the complexities of 
offending behaviour rather than signalling any underlining limitations and/or failures of GPS 
tracking. 
Furthermore, the importance placed on the offender for taking personal responsibility 
for keeping the equipment safe and for regular charging was, in fact, seen as part of a broader 
demonstration of offender engagement and compliance. Almost all the offender managers 
and police officers stressed the importance of trusting offenders, and providing them with 
opportunities to demonstrate responsibility and engagement as part of a broader learning 
process: 
 
Well I mean it gives them ownership over it, which I think can be a positive thing . . . it 
shows that we’re putting that level of trust in them to be responsible which is a good buy-in 
for them in terms of community integration and involvement. (OM4) I think maybe just 
giving them a small amount of responsibility as in the equipment and charging something, 
you know can have a positive effect. (PO1) 
 
Some of the offenders recognised this aspect of the pilot, reflecting on their responsibility for 
charging the tracker as a further indication that they were prepared to take responsibility for 
their behaviour and the changes that they made to their lives:  
 
Well if I just keep, how do you put it? Something to look after for yourself isn’t it? So don’t 
rely on other people all the time. (Ian) 
 
The police sergeant in charge of the police team in the IOMU strongly supported this notion 
of the tracker enhancing responsibility and trust, and was in favour of developing some kind 
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of formal qualification, perhaps leading to an NVQ, for compliance and effective 
management of the kit, as an important indicator of trust and responsibility for future 
employers.  
This broader rehabilitative aspect of the GPS tracker is, of course, closely related to 
the voluntary nature of the participation. The majority of offender managers wished to 
maintain this as a targeted and voluntary scheme, stressing the issue of enhancing personal 
responsibility, as outlined above, but also how it could contribute to intelligence gathering 
and ongoing risk assessments. It was, for example, noted by a number of offender managers 
how an offender’s refusal to wear the tracker, or, indeed, a sudden request for it to be 
removed, provided important intelligence to the police and offender managers that there were 
possible problems that needed to be addressed: 
 
You know it’s a good intelligence piece for us to know who’s turning them down and we’ve 
all had people come in . . . all of a sudden one day ‘I want it taken off’, and then three days 
later they’re back in going ‘I’ll have it back on now’ so that’s interesting for us to know . . . 
even knowing they’re not wearing it, it’s a piece of intelligence that we can use. (OM4) 
 
We might say this person is not charging, they’re starting not to attend their appointments, so 
we might lift their profile with the police and the other agencies we work with so we can look 
at different tactical options . . . maybe looking at different treatment options etc. (OM5) 
 
However, the voluntary nature of the pilot was considered problematic in that it risked 
tracking only the motivated individuals who were showing compliance and willingness to 
change already. Consequently, the police respondents were more enthusiastic about extending 
the trackers to be a mandatory condition of licence or sentence of the court. Similarly, 
20 
 
magistrates expressed the view that GPS tracking would be a useful addition to their 
repertoire of non-custodial sanctions. 
 
Crime Detection 
All of the practitioners in the IOMU emphasised the importance of the tracker as an aid to 
effective deployment of police resources and rapid crime detection. This is, of course, closely 
related to the practical and day-to-day use of the GPS data. To reiterate, GPS tracking does 
enable officials to follow case movements in real time, and instigate immediate interventions 
when the system indicates a breach of conditions. This form of ‘active’ tracking clearly 
requires a considerable investment in terms of monitoring staff. By contrast, passive tracking 
involves the system uploading GPS data about offender movements at regular intervals so 
that it is available for retrospective review if necessary (Shute 2007; Bales et al. 2010). It was 
made clear in a number of the interviews that the IOMU simply did not have the staff 
resources to deliver active GPS tracking. Instead, data for each offender wearing a GPS 
tracker were reviewed once a day and any evidence of non-compliance was shared at the 
morning briefing. As one offender manager put it: ‘we would check it once a day, we 
wouldn’t necessarily be sat there watching somebody move up the streets’ (OM5). Once 
again, we should note that those wearing the trackers did not always appear to understand that 
they were not subject to active real-time monitoring, and so to a degree any effects on 
deterrence and compliance might well be dependent on the persistence of such 
misunderstandings.  
In contrast to the GPS technology used in the 2004–06 trials (Shute 2007), trained 
IOMU staff in Cardiff could access data directly, rather than request information from an 
independent monitoring company. Data could, therefore, be accessed promptly and used 
reactively in response to requests from police or offender managers, and in response to 
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predefined system alerts notifying the IOMU of breach of a specified condition of 
supervision, for example, exclusion zone, non-association, curfew/inclusion zone. 
Consequently, when an offence took place, analysis of the modus operandi in relation to the 
previous record of offenders wearing a GPS tracker would allow innocent individuals who 
were under suspicion to be discounted quickly from police enquiries, but also check for the 
whereabouts of other individuals wearing a GPS tracker who may have been placed near the 
scene. The most often quoted example of rapid crime detection as a result of a GPS tracker 
related to an incident of serious sexual assault, in which the individual had no previous form 
and so would not have immediately come under suspicion. However, analysis of their GPS 
data was able to evidence the fact that the offender followed the victim and also placed him at 
the scene of the assault. This enabled a rapid detection and conviction, and also had benefits 
for the traumatised victim in terms of the reduced need for police interviews and court 
appearances. The advantages of having IOMU staff operating the GPS technology supports 
criticism of the way that EM has been managed in England and Wales to date. As Geoghegan 
(2015) states: ‘why would you take the device out of the hands of the people who needed it 
and could use it most effectively?’ (p.21). 
 
Civil Liberties Concerns  
Critics have pointed to civil liberties concerns surrounding the implications of EM, mainly 
about human rights and up-tariffing. As already stated, these kinds of argument apply with 
even more force to satellite tracking that offers active tracking. Despite this, while a number 
of practitioners (offender managers and the police representatives) reported that they had 
shared these concerns at the outset, the experience of the pilot had changed their views: 
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Initially I was not in favour of it, I think there’s still some areas to be looked at long term in 
terms of human rights which made me a little bit uncomfortable initially, but my opinion of 
that has probably changed since having it because of the usefulness of the [tracker]. (OM4) 
 
Me, personally, I don’t like Big Brother, the thought of GPS tracking and things like that, to 
be honest with you I’d say, thanks but no thanks. Because where it all leads, where it’s going 
to end up. But having spent . . . between twelve and 18 months involved in this project it’s 
opened my eyes a little bit to . . . what it can actually do if it’s used in the right way. (PO3) 
 
What was even more striking was that few of the offenders expressed any concerns about the 
notion of being under real-time surveillance via GPS tracking. For most, this was due to the 
fact that they ‘knew they weren’t doing anything’. However, one interviewee in particular, 
delivered quite a striking dismissal of a ‘civil liberties’ perspective, arguing that high-risk 
offenders (such as himself) had no basis to argue against effective surveillance: 
 
At the end of the day it’s like this yeah, right; . . . if I’ve done nothing wrong in my life, ever 
done nothing wrong in my life yeah? No one got no right to see what I’m doing, if I’m doing 
nothing illegal like no one got no right to follow me around yeah. But I did what I did yeah? 
And I was a problem to society yeah like I was more of a problem to society than society 
could ever have been to me yeah? . . . So I think like until I’ve proved myself again, it’s not 
‘Big Brother’, I brought it on myself, I’m being monitored. (Evan)  
 
For those who did express some initial reservations – such as ‘feeling a bit weird’ about being 
under GPS surveillance – these feelings soon subsided, and the benefits of the tracker were 
seen to overcome any initial concerns.  
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Most of the respondents did, however, express some initial concern about the public 
stigma relating to wearing a tracker, exacerbated due to its large size. However, few of the 
offenders perceived the tracker as an additional punishment, although this is not that 
surprising as they had volunteered to wear it. Nonetheless, it is fair to say that almost all the 
offenders interviewed, despite expressing irritation with this aspect of the equipment, did go 
on to downplay its significance and present it as a relatively minor inconvenience rather than 
a major difficulty. One participant, Stuart, was also able to see this as positive, and described 
the GPS tracker as a ‘symbol’ that he was sorting his life out: 
 
Don’t get me wrong if I went to somewhere public like my daughter asked me to go 
swimming the other day, I went with her, you do get the odd person looks and that you know 
but I don’t really care at the end of the day to me that’s a symbol of me sorting myself out do 
you know what I mean? (Stuart) 
 
Overall, a reduction in adversarial contact with the police related to curfew checks, stop and 
search and arrest, meant that wearing the GPS tracker was generally perceived as an 
extension to the clients’ freedom rather than a further restriction upon it. Comparably, most 
practitioners also saw the broader rehabilitative uses of the tracker as a way of keeping PPOs 
in the community rather than them being recalled to prison.  
While the reasons for the positive assessment of the tracker have already been 
explored, this endorsement of the pilot, was, however, measured in so far as it was tempered 
by a strong commitment to the need to carefully tailor GPS tracking and use it for appropriate 
populations (particularly in the interviews with offender managers). As noted in the first 
section, one of the main concerns with new forms of community sentence (and one which has 
been repeatedly raised in the past in relation to EM) concerns the danger of ‘net-widening’ 
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and ‘up-tariffing’, whereby new penal sanctions introduced to be an alternative to custody, in 
practice are used for offenders who would have received a lesser sentence. Exploring the 
degree to which net-widening has occurred has been an important challenge for previous 
research on EM. However, in the case of the current pilot where GPS tracking was not given 
as a sentence of the court, there is little evidence of net-widening in this sense. Indeed, 
although it is not possible to test this statistically, the qualitative evidence suggests that those 
who wore GPS trackers were offered this as a clear alternative to custody (either via recall 
through breach or via agreement to the tracker enhancing the probability of release on 
licence). Thus, at least in the ways in which it was deployed in the Cardiff pilot, there was 
evidence that GPS tracking did actually keep offenders out of custody (rather than being used 
for offenders who would have been given less intrusive forms of supervision). A number of 
the practitioner respondents expressed concerns that this would not necessarily remain the 
case should GPS tracking become an option for the courts or made more widely available (for 
example, to the police and/or future CRCs). 
 
Conclusion 
This article suggests that when used in a limited and targeted way, GPS  tracking can have 
some positive impacts. There were some expected differences in emphasis between the 
various respondents about the main benefits of GPS tracking. Police interviewees tended to 
highlight the potential benefits in terms of control, surveillance and detection. However, both 
offender managers and the police referred to a range of benefits related to offender-support 
and rehabilitation, and also with regard to providing enhanced intelligence in relation to the 
management of risk. Magistrate interviewees saw the tracker as a potentially useful additional 
option for convicted offenders at risk of custody and something that would enhance the level 
of control in a community sentence and have credibility with the public. The offenders were 
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generally more positive about the tracker in terms of reducing the amount of adversarial 
contact with the police related to curfew checks, stop and search and possible arrest and 
reconviction. However, notwithstanding these differences in emphasis there was an 
expectation across those interviewed that GPS tracking had the capacity to simultaneously 
address all these aims.  
The research revealed little explicit concern amongst the offenders in regard to the 
threat GPS monitoring posed to their civil liberties, though perhaps this was to be expected, 
given that all participants volunteered to take part. No respondents discussed the tracker in 
terms of retributive punishment. The findings outlined in this small study can be seen as 
cautiously positive overall and demonstrate a number of potential benefits of GPS tracking, 
including deterrence, crime control, as well as broader rehabilitative uses. Few of the 
offenders, in fact, expressed any concerns about the degree of surveillance they were under. 
Of course, the offenders’ seemingly unconcerned attitude about GPS surveillance is 
unsurprising given that they would have all had recent (or current) experience of prison, and, 
as we have outlined, were under the regular surveillance of the police (including visits during 
the night and in the early morning) when released on licence. The ‘choices’ available to these 
offenders were markedly constrained. It is, therefore, not that surprising that for this group of 
offenders at least, the GPS tracker was generally perceived as an extension, rather than a 
curtailment, of their freedom.  
The positive endorsement of the pilot was, to a large degree, related to the voluntary 
nature of the scheme and its ‘ownership’ within the IOMU. Although it has been recognised 
that voluntary participation itself signals a pre-existing desire on behalf of the offender to 
comply and engage (and, therefore, the GPS trackers were not being targeted on the more 
difficult group of PPOs), it was seen to help support broader rehabilitative elements. This 
includes enhancing responsibility, trust and commitment to change, as well as increasing the 
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chances of offenders accessing rehabilitation provisions such as employment and 
accommodation. This view of tracking has been emphasised in earlier studies of static EM, in 
which it has been argued that as part of a wider package of carefully-designed interventions, 
EM can provide a degree of structure to the sometimes chaotic lives of offenders and in this 
sense enhance the possibilities for engagement, reform and resettlement into the community. 
The Cardiff study did not find evidence to support concerns raised in previous research on 
GPS tracking (and indeed, EM in general), that tracking will have a negative effect on the 
face-to-face work undertaken by offender managers to address offending behaviour. Previous 
work pointed to the use of EM as a technological ‘silver bullet’ that would simply replace the 
important interpersonal engagement between offenders and probation officers, and turn the 
latter into straightforward agents of surveillance and control (Nellis 1991). In contrast to 
earlier research, within this study, the GPS tracker became very much a part of the narrative 
between offender managers and their offenders, providing useful background information to 
signal any problems the client might be experiencing, and to help reassure the offender 
manager (and sometimes other agencies) about the clients’ accounts of events in terms of 
breach and recalls. Similarly, this research suggests that in some circumstances, GPS tracking 
can also help to manage strained relationship between this group of offenders and the police. 
The voluntary nature and the positioning of the pilot within the unit also helped to 
ensure that concerns about net-widening and up-tariffing were avoided, as trackers were 
deployed in a targeted and strategic way. There are, of course, further concerns with 
expanding the use of GPS – including a greater level of damage to equipment and other forms 
of non-compliance, and major problems with charging (which would have to be made a 
compulsory and enforceable condition of licence/sentence). Another concern with expanding 
the use of GPS reflects the impact of public expectation. Most media discussions of GPS 
tracking in the UK contribute to the mistaken assumption that this is active tracking of 
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offenders in real time, rather than the passive forms discussed above. Indeed, one might argue 
that there is a degree of collusion on the part of both politicians arguing for an expansion of 
such schemes, and local practitioners charged with running them, in promoting (or at least 
turning a blind eye to) such misunderstandings. Trying to develop such forms of more active 
tracking would have major resource implications, even in the limited form used by the 
Cardiff pilot, let alone if there was a major expansion of the use of GPS as a sentence of the 
court, for example. It is unlikely that such ‘active’ forms of tracking could ever be introduced 
on a general scale, as the costs on the public purse would be prohibitive (Geoghegan 2012). 
Given the current political support for GPS tracking, it is, perhaps, inevitable that it 
will at some point become available to the court as a condition of bail, as a sentence, or as an 
enforceable condition of release on licence from prison. While it seems that Buddi will no 
longer be involved in the delivery of government-commissioned GPS tracking, at least in the 
foreseeable future, other commercial organisations will be responsible for its delivery. As 
Nellis (2014) acknowledges, EM has always been privatised, but this takes on added 
significance in the context of the reconfiguration and marketisation of probation services for 
the management of low- to medium-risk offenders. Nellis (2014) notes that although there 
was no explicit connection between government support for expanded use of GPS  tracking in 
the criminal justice system and its ‘Transforming Rehabilitation’ agenda, there is a clear 
consonance between them. As he argued: ‘EM technology was being upgraded at the same 
moment as the professional expertise of the probation service was being downgraded’ 
(p.177). This immediately raises concerns about the degree to which some of the dangers of 
untrammelled expansion of GPS tracking, and in particular net-widening, can be avoided. It 
is likely that while PPOs are an obvious focus, GPS tracking may also be used for other 
offender groups. There are already suggestions that such GPS tracking would be suitable for 
convicted sexual offenders (for example, in terms of policing exclusion zones around schools 
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or in playgrounds) and for domestic violence perpetrators (to ensure that they were staying 
away from their victims’ homes).  
While the civil liberties concerns have been significantly downplayed within this 
evaluation, this reflected the voluntary and targeted nature of the pilot. If GPS tracking was to 
become available as a sentence to the courts, and/or placed under the direction and control of 
the police, it may prove impossible to maintain the consideration given in the Cardiff pilot to 
the circumstances of the offender and the offence, and, in particular, spatial and temporal 
patterns of offending (Hudson, Taylor and Henley 2015). As one of the offender managers 
argued: ‘We’ve got to be able to argue that the risk [the offender] poses is high enough to 
warrant that loss of the right in the same way as going to prison is; [that they] pose a risk high 
enough to lose those civil liberties’ (OM3).  
Although this was a small study, the findings suggest that when used in a measured 
and targeted way, GPS tracking can contribute effectively to offender rehabilitation and the 
management of risk, as well as providing enhanced possibilities for prevention and detection 
of crime. However, such benefits would soon be outweighed by the disadvantages in the 
event of an uncontrolled expansion of GPS tracking. Given the political attraction of 
technological ‘solutions’ in crime control, the marketisation of probation, and the promise of 
more austerity to come, it may prove impossible to maintain a restrained approach in the 
future. 
 
Notes 
Buddi was founded in 2005 and became known for innovative application of GPS tracking 
technology in relation to dementia patients and patients on temporary leave from secure 
psychiatric care. The company used more compact and less expensive tracking equipment 
than market competitors. Its trackers were attached by steel reinforced ankle straps which 
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were much more difficult to remove than the plastic straps more widely used in static RF tags 
(Nellis 2014). 
In the interview examples cited, offenders’ names have been changed to preserve anonymity, 
and offender managers and police officers are numbered (OM1, OM2, 
. . . and PO1, PO2, . . .). 
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